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The design and preliminary evaluation of a pressure sensor-based typing biometrics authentication system (PBAS) is discussed
in this paper. This involves the integration of pressure sensors, signal processing circuit, and data acquisition devices to generate
waveforms, which when concatenated, produce a pattern for the typed password. The system generates two templates for typed
passwords. First template is for the force applied on each password key pressed. The second template is for latency of the password
keys. These templates are analyzed using two classifiers. Autoregressive (AR) classifier is used to authenticate the pressure template.
Latency classifier is used to authenticate the latency template. Authentication is complete by matching the results of these classifiers
concurrently. The proposed system has been implemented by constructing users’ database patterns which are later matched to the
biometric patterns entered by each user, thereby enabling the system to accept or reject the user. Experiments have been conducted
to test the performance of the overall PBAS system and results obtained showed that this proposed system is reliable with many
potential applications for computer security.
Copyright © 2008 Wasil Elsadig Eltahir et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although a variety of authentication devices to verify a
user’s identity are in use today for computer access control,
passwords have been and probably would remain the pre-
ferred method. Password authentication is an inexpensive
and familiar paradigm that most operating systems support.
However, this method is vulnerable to intruder access. This
is largely due to the wrongful use of passwords by many
users and to the unabated simplicity of the mechanism. This
simplicity makes such system susceptible to unsubstantiated
intruder attacks. Methods are needed, therefore, to extend,
enhance, or reinforce existing password authentication tech-
niques.
There are two possible approaches to achieve this, namely
by measuring the time between consecutive keystrokes
“latency” or measuring the force applied on each keystroke.
The pressure-based biometric authentication system (PBAS)
has been designed to combine these two approaches so as to
enhance computer security.
PBAS employs force sensors to measure the exact amount
of force a user exerts while typing. Signal processing is
then carried out to construct a waveform pattern for the
password entered. In addition to the force, PBAS measures
the actual timing traces “latency.” The combination of both
information “force pattern and latency” is used for the
biometric analysis of the user.
As compared to conventional keystroke biometric
authentication systems, PBAS has employed a new approach
by constructing a waveform pattern for the keystroke pass-
word. This pattern provides a more dynamic and consistent
biometric characteristics of the user. It also eliminates the
security threat posed by breaching the system through online
network as the access to the system is only possible through
the pressure sensor reinforced keyboard “biokeyboard”.
Figure 1 shows PBAS block diagram. The operation of
the system relies on constructing a users’ database and then
processing this information online through data classifiers.
The database stores users’ login names, passwords, and
biometric patterns. Data classifiers are used to analyze and
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Figure 1: PBAS block diagram.
associate users with distinctive typing characteristic models.
PBAS has been tested with combination of two classifiers,
namely:
(1) autoregressive classifiers,
(2) latency classifiers.
These classifiers have been tested and the results obtained
from the experimental setup have shown that these classifiers
are very consistent and reliable.
2. DESIGN OF PRESSURE-BASED TYPING BIOMETRIC
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM (PBAS)
Keystroke authentication systems available in the market
are mostly software-based. This is due to the ease of
use as well as the low cost of the mechanism. Any new
keystroke authentication system has to consider these factors
in the design. Likewise, the system designed for PBAS uses
simplified hardware which minimizes the cost of production.
The system is designed to be compatible with any type of PC.
Moreover, it does not require any external power supply. In
general, the system components are low cost and commonly
available in the market.
The operation of the system is depicted in Figure 1.
System starts by prompting user to enter his/her user ID
and password. The alphanumeric keyboard (biokeyboard)
extracts the pressure template for the password entered. At
the same time, the system calculates the latency pairs for the
entered password and accompanies it with pressure template
in a single data file. This data file is transferred to the system’s
database.
In the learning mode, the user is required to repeatedly
key in the password for several times (10–20) to stabilize
his/her keystroke template.
In the authentication mode, the user is requested to enter
his/her ID and password. The resulting pressure template
and latency vector are compared with those modeled in the
database using the AR and latency classifiers. Depending on
the results of this comparison, the user will be either granted
or denied access to the system.
2.1. System hardware components
As illustrated in Figure 2, the main hardware components of
PBAS are as follows:
CPU unit
BNC connector
Analog interface
Alphanumeric keyboard
Figure 2: Integration of PBAS components.
(1) alphanumeric keyboard (biokeyboard) embedded
with force sensors to measure the keystroke pressure
while typing;
(2) data acquisition system consisting of the following
components:
(a) analog interface box (filtering and amplification
of signal),
(b) DAQ PCI card fitted into the PC.
(3) PC/central processing unit (CPU) for running the
PBAS program using Windows XP operating system.
2.2. Pressure sensitive alphanumeric
keyboard (biokeyboard)
A special keyboard was manufactured to acquire the
alphanumeric password and the keystroke pressure template
of the user. The biokeyboard layout is identical to normal
commercial keyboard. This is crucial to maintain an intrinsic
system that does not alter user typing habits. Figure 3 shows
the biokeyboard front, back, and side views.
To measure the keystroke pressure, ultra thin flexible
force sensors are fixed below each keyboard key. A plastic
spring is fixed between the key and the sensing area to ensure
that it does not get dislodged. This is necessary to avoid
erroneous readings.
The keyboard operates just as a normal alphanumeric
keyboard in addition to measuring keystroke pressure. Thus,
the users of this system would not find any differences
between this keyboard and the commercial ones.
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Figure 3: Pressure sensitive alphanumeric keyboard (biokeyboard).
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Figure 4: Operation of data acquisition system.
2.3. Data acquisition system
The force sensors are connected in parallel and then to the
sensor drive circuit. The drive circuit is contained inside
the analogue interface box (see Figure 2). The connection
between the keyboard and the analogue interface box is
made through a cable. Figure 4 shows the connection and
operation of the data acquisition system.
The analogue interface box passes the keystroke pressure
template from the biokeyboard to the PC through the DAQ
PCI card. It contains amplification and filtering circuit to
improve the voltage acquired from the biokeyboard. The
analogue interface box also contains two knobs to adjust the
sensitivity of the voltage (and hence keystroke pattern) by
changing the amplification gain of the drive circuit.
Some further signal processing procedures are used to
concatenate keystroke signals of different keys pressed when
typing a password. This concatenation forms a continuous
pattern for each keystroke password.
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2.4. Validation of keystroke force approach
An experiment has been conducted to evaluate the sig-
nificance of force analysis in the classification of users
keystroke typing biometrics. In this experiment a group of 12
professional typists were asked to type a common password
tri-msn4. The system acquired the latency and peak force for
each character of the password entered by users. Each subject
was required to type the same password 10 times. Here, each
typed password consists of seven latency and eight peak force
features, resulting in fifteen features for each user.
Principle component analysis (PCA) was then applied to
analyze the dataset over first two dominant principal compo-
nents axis. Three different classification cases were examined,
namely: (a) classification by latency, (b) classification by peak
force, (c) and lastly classification by combining latency and
peak force.
Latency features were similar as seen in Figure 5. This is
logical for consistent typists because they use the same hand
and wrist lateral positions when typing and hence they tend
to type with almost the same speed.
The results in Figure 5 show that users 11 and 8 have
distinctive latencies while users 1, 3, and 6 exhibit high
similarities that can be considered as a group. User 12 on the
other hand has a relatively high variation.
In Figure 6 it is apparent that peak force has better
classification as compared to that of latency. This is justified
by the fact that the typing force varies for different typists.
However, similarities amongst each single user’s data points
are somehow lower than that of latency. Thus, we conclude
that keystroke force is comparatively higher in variation than
latency.
As may be seen in Figure 7, combining force and latency
has improved the data classification for the users. This
diagram illustrates that data clustering of each single user is
better with the combined analysis of force and latency. Since
the two variables vary in different manners, it is therefore
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Figure 6: PCA for peak force.
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Figure 7: PCA for latency and peak force.
necessary to design two classifiers to measure (or evaluate)
them.
3. DYNAMIC KEYSTROKE CLASSIFIERS
Dynamic keystroke template results from a distinctive
keystroke action. When a user enters a password, a single
keystroke is applied on each key pressed.
Figure 8 shows a typical pressure template acquired for a
password of six characters. The template is for user “MJE1”
and the password used is “123asd.”
This diagram shows that the pressure template points are
interrelated in time and are of random nature. This would
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Figure 8: Keystroke pattern for single-user six-character password.
suggest that statistical signal analysis may be useful to classify
these templates.
AR classifier based on stochastic signal modeling has
been developed for the classification of the keystroke pressure
template. As for the keystroke latency, a separate classifier
has been developed based on the key down action. This
classifier is used together with the AR-based keystroke
pressure classifier. These classifiers are discussed in detail in
the following sections.
3.1. Latency classifier
Keystroke authentication using time digraphs (latency) has
been investigated thoroughly with many researchers [6–10].
Many useful methodologies have been presented and are in
use with the current latency keystroke authentication systems
available in the market.
Joyce and Gupta discussed the design of identity verifier
based on four input strings (login name, password, 1st name,
and last name). The verification is done by comparing the
mean reference signature “M” with a test signature “T .” The
norm ‖M − T‖ is computed and if this norm is less than the
threshold for the user, the attempt is accepted; otherwise it is
flagged as an imposter attempt [7].
Though this approach produces relatively satisfactory
results, it requires relatively lengthy input string. A modified
approach has been devised here for PBAS latency authen-
tication. PBAS uses the password string only for latency
verification.
3.1.1. Creating mean reference latency vector
(1) Registered users are prompt to reenter their password
(10–20) times, latency vector for each trial is saved in
an individual data file resulting in (n) number of files
in the database, where n is the number of trials.
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(2) Data treatment is applied on the data files to remove
outliers and erroneous values.
(3) An average latency vector is calculated using the user
trial sample. This results in a single file containing the
mean latency vector (R) for n password trials. This
file is used as reference which will be used for latency
authentication.
3.1.2. Calculating suitable threshold
Thresholding is used to decide an acceptable difference
margin between the reference latency vector (R) and the
latency vector provided by the user upon verification (V).
The threshold is computed based on the data files saved in
the database. A threshold is set for each user based on the
variability of his latency signatures. A user that has little
variability in his latencies would have a small threshold. User
with high variability should have larger threshold. Standard
deviation is the variability measure used.
Standard deviation between the mean (R) latency vector
and the user sample is measured. A threshold based on the
standard deviation is used for authentication based on the
following rule:
m−1∑
k=1
∣∣Rk −Vk
∣∣ ≤ c∗d, (1)
where m is the password length, Rk is the kth latency value
in the reference latency vector, Vk is the kth latency value
in the user-inputted latency vector, c is an access threshold
that depends on the variability of the user latency vector,
and d is the distance in standard deviation units between the
reference and sample latency vectors.
In order to classify user attempt, we define the latency
score SL for the user attempt to be
SL =
∑m−1
k=1
∣∣Rk −Vk
∣∣
c∗d . (2)
Therefore, depending on the value of SL, the classifier output
will be
SL
⎧
⎨
⎩
≤ 1, accept template,
> 1, reject template.
(3)
Table 1 shows the reference latency vector for user
“MJE1” which was calculated by the above mentioned
method for a sample of 10 trials. Five latency vectors
are used to test the threshold c for this reference profile
(see Table 1). The standard deviation was calculated to be
Sy = 46.5357 milliseconds and a threshold of 2 standard
deviations above the mean (c = 2) resulted in the following
variation interval 253.9748 ≥ R − V ≥ 67.83189. This
threshold takes in all 5 trials of the user. However, this
is a relatively high threshold value and in many practical
situations such values would only be recommended for
unprofessional users who are usually not very keen typists.
The user here is a moderate typist. This is evident by his
relatively high standard deviation. High standard deviation
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Figure 9: Latency threshold versus FAR and FRR rates.
is also a measure of high variability in the users’ latency
pattern; this usually indicates that the user template has not
yet stabilized, perhaps due to insufficient training.
Table 2 shows the variation of threshold values c (from
0.5 to 2.0) and its effect on accepting the user trials.
For this user, a threshold value that is based on standard
deviation of 2.0 provides an acceptance rate of 100% (after
eliminating outliers). However, a high threshold value would
obviously increase the imposter pass rate. Therefore for
normal typists, the threshold values should only be within
the range of 0.5 to 1.5.
An experiment was conducted to assess the effect of
varying the latency threshold value on the FAR and FRR
rates. In this experiment, an ensemble for 23 authentic users
and around 50 intruders were selected randomly to produce
authentic and intruder access trials. Authentic users were
given 10 trials each and intruders were given 3 trials per
account. All trials were used for the calculations and no
outliers were removed. The graphical user interface used was
normal (see Figure 18). Figure 9 shows that the equal error
rate (EER) for the FAR and the FRR rates was 24% and it
occurred at a threshold value of 2.25. This relatively high FAR
rate is expected since the password strings used were mainly
short in length and weak in strength.
3.2. AR-Burg classifier
The AR algorithm uses the notion of signal analysis to
reproduce the users’ keystroke pressure template. The repro-
duced template is then compared with the keystroke template
produced by the alleged intruders. Based on this comparison
an authentication decision is made.
A signal model approach is advocated here since the
pressure template points are interrelated across time. The AR
signal model is defined as follows:
y(n) + a(1)y(n− 1) + a(2)y(n− 2) + · · · + a(p)y(n− p)
= x(n),
(4)
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Table 1: Reference latency tested against 5 authentic user trials.
Password
(asd123)
Reference
latency vector
T 1 T 2 T 3 T 4 T 5
a-s 201.9231 203 187 172 203 235
s-d 162.8571 156 188 171 156 93
d-1 316.2308 235 187 219 188 250
1-2 185.2000 187 203 203 187 203
2-3 108.5714 110 110 110 94 79
Table 2: Effect of threshold value on user acceptance rate.
Standard
deviation
Upper limit Lower limit Acceptance percentage
0.5 184.1712 137.6355 40
1.0 207.439 114.3676 60
1.5 230.7069 91.09975 80
2.0 253.9748 67.83189 100
where n is the time index, y(n) is the output, x(n) is the
input, and p is the model order.
For signal modeling y(n) becomes the signal to be
modeled and the a(i) coefficients need to be estimated based
on the signal’s characteristics.
If we use the above equation to predict future values of
the signal ŷ(n), the equation becomes
ŷ(n) = −a(1)y(n− 1)
− a(2)y(n− 2)− · · · − a(p)y(n− p).
(5)
Now, we define the error from e(n) to be the difference
between the predicted and the actual signal point. Therefore
e(n) can be defined as
y(n) + a(1)y(n− 1) + a(2)y(n− 2) + · · · + a(p)y(n− p)
= e(n).
(6)
The total squared error (TSE) for predicted signal is
TSE =
N−1∑
n=1
e2n. (7)
The AR model is used most often because the solution
equations for its parameters are simpler and more developed
than those of either moving average (MA) or autoregressive
moving average (ARMA) models [1, 2].
Burg method has been chosen for this application
because it utilizes both forward and backward prediction
errors for finding model coefficients. It produces models at
lower variance (S2p) as compared to other methods [1].
Authentication is done by comparing the total squared
error TSE percentage of the users in the database with
that generated by the linear prediction model. Previous
experiments proved that authentic users can achieve TSE
margin of less than 10% [3].
3.2.1. Identifying optimum pressure template for
AR modeling
An algorithm was developed in Matlab to identify the best
pressure template in the user sample. This pattern is used for
estimating the AR model parameters of the user keystroke
pressure. The algorithm uses the correlation technique to
calculate the accumulative correlation index (ACI) which is
the accumulation of the correlation between each pressure
pattern and the whole sample. The pattern with the highest
ACI is chosen for the model.
3.2.2. Identifying the optimum TSE acceptance margin
The TSE relative prediction error (RPE) is calculated by the
following equation:
Relative Prediction Error =
∣∣∣∣
TSEm − TSEs
TSEm
∣∣∣∣, (8)
where TSEm is the TSE calculated for the user’s AR-Burg
model in database. TSEs is the TSE for the pressure pattern
of the user.
Classification of user attempt is done by comparing RPE
to threshold T according to the following:
RPE
⎧
⎨
⎩
≤ T , accept template,
> T , reject template,
where, 0 < T ≤ 1. (9)
Based on previous research experiments [3], it was reported
that authentic users can achieve up to 0.1 RPE while
intruders exhibit unbounded fluctuating RPE that can reach
above 3.0 [3].
An experiment was conducted to assess the effect of
varying the TSE threshold value on the FAR and FRR rates.
In the experiment, an ensemble for 23 authentic users and
around 50 intruders were selected randomly to produce
authentic and intruder access trials. Authentic users were
given 10 trials each and intruders were given 3 trials per
account. All trials were used for the calculation of results and
no outliers were removed. The graphical user interface used
was normal (see Figure 18). Figure 10 shows how the FAR
and the FRR vary as we change the TSE threshold values.
The EER was 25% and it was recorded at TSE of 37.5%.
Compared to latency, TSE has lower FRR spread out as the
threshold is increased.
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Figure 10: TSE threshold versus FAR and FRR rates.
The AR modeling algorithm has been implemented in
the following order.
(1) The user is prompted to enter the password several
times (20 times).
(2) The optimum pattern for modeling the user is
identified using the ACI values obtained from the
sample.
(3) The best AR model order is determined based on
the final prediction error (FPE) and the Akaike’s
information criteria (AIC).
(4) The AR model is constructed and model coefficients
are saved for user verification.
(5) Using AR model coefficients, the linear prediction
model is constructed to predict the original template
from the pattern entered by the user.
(6) Using the linear prediction model TSEm is calculated
for user’s template in database. The RPE score is
used to discriminate between authentic and intruder
attempts.
(7) If RPE ≤ T , user is authentic, whereas if RPE > T ,
then user is intruder.
3.3. Receiver operating curve for TSE and
latency classifiers
The receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) is used
to assess the effect of the threshold value on the FAR and
FRR rates. ROC curve assesses the trade-off between low
intruder pass rate and high authentic pass rate as the decision
threshold value varies. Figure 11 shows that the latency
classifier has slightly better separation than the AR classifier.
In addition to that, the latency classifier has better intruder
rejection rate whereas AR classifier has a higher true pass
rate. The graph also shows that the performance of both
classifiers at the EER points is very similar; therefore, it
is expected that by combining both algorithms the overall
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Latency
TSE
EER
EER
Figure 11: ROC showing performance of latency and TSE classi-
fiers.
system performance will be improved. The operating range
for the AR classifier is between 0.1 and 1.0 threshold values of
T corresponding to very low FAR and FRR rates, respectively.
The operating range for the latency classifier is between 0.1
and 5.0 threshold values c corresponding to very low FAR
and FRR rates, respectively.
4. SYSTEM ALGORITHMS AND
PROGRAM STRUCTURES
With the integration of software and hardware, the PBAS
algorithm was designed to have two main operation modes.
(1) Training users and creating biometric template pro-
files; at this stage the user is requested to key in his/her
ID and the user trains his/her password.
(2) Authenticating existing users based on the identity
they claim; users provide ID and password which are
compared with the biometric profiles of the users in
the database.
Figure 12 shows the flow graph for the overall PBAS training
and authentication process. The authentication mode con-
sists of two phases.
(1) Normal authentication, which involves the password
combination and its compliance with the one saved
in the database.
(2) Biometric authentication, which is done by the
combination of latency along with the AR classifiers.
Firstly, the user will select the mode of operation. In the
training mode, the access-control system requests the user
to type in the login ID and a new password. The system
then asks the user to reenter the password several times
in order to stabilize his/her typing pattern. The resulting
latency and pressure keystroke templates are saved in the
database. During training, if the user mistypes the password
the system prompts user to reenter the password from
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the beginning. The use of backspace key is not allowed
as it disrupts the biometric pattern. When registration is
done, system administrator uses these training samples to
model user keystroke profiles. The design of user profiles is
done offline. After that, the administrator saves the users’
keystroke template models along with the associated user ID
and password in the access-control database.
In the authentication mode, the access-control system
requests the user to type in the login ID and a password.
Upon entering this information the system compares the
alphanumeric password combination with the information
in the database. If the password does not match, the system
will reject the user instantly and without authenticating his
keystroke pattern. However, if the password matches then
the user keystroke template will be calculated and verified
with the information saved in the database. If the keystroke
template matches the template saved in database, the user is
granted access.
If the user ID and alphanumeric password are correct,
but the new typing template does not match the reference
template, the security system has several options, which can
be revised occasionally. A typical scenario might be that
PBAS advises a security or network administrator that the
typing pattern for a user ID and password is not authentic
and that a security breach might be possible. The security
administrator can then closely monitor the session to ensure
that the user does nothing unauthorized or illegal.
Another practical situation applies to automatic teller
machine (ATM) system. If the user’s password is correct but
the keystroke pattern does not match, the system can restrict
the amount of cash withdrawn on that occasion to minimize
any damages made by possible theft or robbery.
5. EXPERIMENTS ON PBAS PERFORMANCE USING
COMBINED LATENCY AND AR CLASSIFIERS
As concluded from the ROC curve (Figure 11), it is expected
that combining the latency and TSE classifiers will produce
better authentication results. The threshold used for the
TSE classifier will be T = 0.4 as recommended by the
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Figure 13: Choosing mode of operation.
Figure 14: Registering new user.
Figure 15: Training user password.
Figure 16: Validation mode.
Figure 17: Guided validation (experiment 1).
EER calculated earlier. As for the latency threshold c, it is
recommended to use a threshold value between 2.0 and 2.25
for unprofessional typists and 1.0 to 1.5 for professional
typists.
5.1. Experimental variables
The experimental variables that are assumed to play role
in the performance of the system are as follows: (1-)
user disposition, (2-) intruder knowledge of the authentic
keystroke latency, (3-) sensitivity of the data acquisition
system, (4-) strength of user password, (5-) sampling rate of
the data acquisition system, and (6-) threshold values of the
AR and latency classifiers.
In the experiment, four variables were fixed and two were
varied for analysis. These variables were
(1) intruder knowledge of the authentic keystroke
latency,
(2) threshold values of the AR classifier.
By varying these two variables, we will be able to answer two
important questions.
(1) How does exposing the database to intruders affect
the system security?
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(2) What is the effect of increasing the TSE percentage on
the FAR rate?
The following section will try to answer these questions.
In addition, we will try to analyze the user passwords and
identify possible reasons behind any successful intruder
attacks.
Two experiments were conducted with a population
of 23 users. Eleven of the participants were females and
12 were males. Participants were of different ages (18 to
50). One participant “user3” was left handed. Training
and authentication for each user password were done
on two different occasions (at least not on the same
day).
All users participating in the experiments were briefed
thoroughly about the operation of PBAS. They were also told
about the purpose of the experiment to ensure maximum
interaction from users.
At the beginning, users were asked to choose an ID and
password, “ID up to eight characters and password not less
than six characters”. The users trained their password for
twenty trials. The administrator created AR-keystroke model
and latency vector for each user and saved it in the system
database.
All 23 users participated in the first experiment. However,
only successful hackers were inducted to the second experi-
ment.
In both experiments, a simple program with interactive
GUI would first ask the user to key in his/her ID, and
then the computer would create a random list of 10
accounts “five male and five female” for the user to attempt
hacking.
To calculate the FAR in both experiments, users were
asked to repeat keying the password for 10 times. The
results were evaluated online by recording the instances of
acceptance and rejection for each user.
5.2. Experimental procedure
The two experiments were arranged as follows.
5.2.1. Experiment 1: “guided authentication”
In this experiment hackers were allowed to see the users’
reference latency vector along with their own pressure
template, a GUI window was fixed with two indicator lights
“one for latency and one for pressure” that flashes green
when either latency or pressure is within the acceptance
margin. TSE threshold T was set to 0.15.
Authentic users were given ten attempts per account
whereas intruders were given four hacking attempts per
account. Twenty three registered users participated in this
experiment generating a total of 230 authentic attempts, 19
of these users participated as intruders generating a total of
760 intruder attacks. According to Figure 10, it is expected
that the FRR will be as high as 60% and that the FAR will be
as low as 11% (knowing that the tests are different).
Figure 18: Normal validation (experiment 2).
5.2.2. Experiment 2: “normal authentication”
In this experiment GUI window was restricted not to show
any information about user pressure or latency vectors.
RPE threshold T was set to 0.4; this increase was made to
reduce the FRR rate as recommended from the ROC curve
(Figure 11). Authentic users were given 10 attempts whereas
intruders were given 3 hacking attempts per account. All 23
authentic users participated in this experiment generating
a total of 230 authentic attempts. As for the intruder
attempts, only 8 users “successful hackers of experiment
1” participated in this experiment generating a total of
240 intruder attacks. According to Figure 10, it is expected
that the FRR will be as high as 21% and that the FAR
will be as low as 28% (knowing that the tests are differ-
ent).
5.3. Experimental results
While the computer security society recommends that
a safe password should be a combination of alphabets,
numeric, and special characters, almost 80% of users have
chosen passwords that do not conform to the standard
measures of password safety. Some users chose their login
ID as the password; some used standard words, com-
bination of repeated letters, or combination of adjacent
keyboard keys with no special characters. All of these
factors have rendered the users’ passwords very vulnera-
ble with respect to the password security standards. Our
assumption is that PBAS will improve the performance
of weak passwords by combining the latency and AR
classifiers. Table 4 shows the results for the experiments
conducted.
The FRR for the first experiment was 10.43% which is
very much less than the maximum expected FRR of 60%.
This could be attributed to the improved typing efficiency of
the users which minimizes the occurrence of outliers during
the experiment.
It is noticed that the increase in AR threshold T from 0.15
to 0.4 has reduced the FRR by 70% while increasing the FAR
by 138%.
Table 5 shows the cross comparison for the FRR rate
recorded for the 8 successful hackers across experiments 1
and 2. The table shows that the increase in the AR threshold
T along with the removal of feedback did not increase the
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Table 3: FAR and FRR for experiments 1 and 2.
User ID Password User attempts Intruder attempts
Experiment 1
Intruder attempts
Experiment 2
FAR% FRR% FAR% FRR%
∗1 + 1User 1(m) 123asd 10 44 2.272 10 15 6.666 10
User 2(m) dadn4tay 10 52 0 0 15 0 0
User 3(m) alshaijiy 10 48 0 20 12 0 0
∗1 User 4(m) mmu123 10 64 1.562 20 3 0 10
∗1 User 5(m) tigna12 10 48 2.083 10 15 0 0
User 6(m) mohammedhasan44 10 48 0 0 9 0 0
∗2 User 7(f) tastas13 10 48 4.166 0 9 0 0
User 8(f) dowrita- 10 52 0 20 9 0 10
User 9(m) nanana 10 20 0 20 6 0 20
User 10(m) lrtvib 10 56 0 0 3 0 0
User 11(m) obahja1313 10 32 0 0 12 0 0
User 12(m) sal12sal 10 36 0 20 15 0 0
User 13(m) alrubataby 10 20 0 0 12 0 0
User 14(m) hussam44 10 20 0 0 6 0 0
∗3 +3 User 15(f) fardusa 10 44 6.818 0 15 20 0
User 16(f) salah1 10 48 0 10 6 0 0
User 17(f) ktwon123 10 48 0 10 15 0 0
∗2 User 18(f) alkontabbad 10 44 4.545 30 3 0 10
User 19(f) suli00 10 32 0 0 15 0 0
User 20(f) asma23 10 48 0 10 15 0 0
∗1 +4 User 21(f) fathiya 10 32 3.125 20 18 22.22 0
∗1 +1 User 22(f) faduma 10 20 5 20 12 8.333 10
User 23(f) subway 10 16 0 20 6 0 0
∗Denotes hacked logins in 1st experiment, superscript is number of hacks.
+Denotes hacked logins in 2nd experiment, superscript is number of hacks.
Table 4: Total FAR and FRR for experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment
Number
of authentic
participants
Number of
intruder
participants
Number of attacks Number of successful attacks FAR% FRR%
I 23 19 760 12 1.57 10.43
II 23 8 240 9 3.75 3.04
Table 5: Comparing FRR for successful hackers in experiments 1
and 2.
Experiment
Number
of intruder
participants
Number of
attacks
Number of
successful
attacks
FAR%
I 8 320 12 3.75
II 8 240 9 3.75
FAR rate; this means that the removal of feedback canceled
the effect of increasing T threshold. Hence, there is some
correlation between knowledge of the verifier and the ability
of an imposter to match the reference signature of another
user.
Table 6 shows a comparison between results obtained
here and previous research efforts. A comparison is not
statistically valid as these systems use different sample
size with different parameters and methodologies to mea-
sure the keystroke. It is important to note that earlier
research emphasized on the strength of the password
string and as a result, the users had to use either lengthy
strings (sometimes 4 strings) or strong strings (combina-
tion of alphanumeric keys and special characters). PBAS,
however, does not require lengthy or strong password
strings. Consequently, it is more user friendly, but on the
other hand this makes it more susceptible to intruder
attacks.
5.3.1. Statistical significance of experimental results
It is important to assess the statistical significance of the
results obtained in this experiment. In general statistics, the
larger the number of volunteers and the number of attempts
made (sample size), the more accurate the results would be
[4].
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Table 6: Comparison of our results with previous efforts.
Research Number of participants Training samples Password string FAR% FRR%
Legget and Williams (1988) [6] 36 12 large 5.00 5.50
Joyce and Gupta [7] 33 8 4 13.30 0.17
De Ru and Eloff [8] 29 Varies (2 to 10) 1 2.80 7.40
Haider et al. [9] Not mentioned 15 1 6.00 2.00
Arau´jo et al. [10] 30 10 1 1.89 1.45
Our research 23 20 1 3.75 3.04
To calculate the variance for the FRR rate we use the
following:
p̂ = 1
n
∑
pi = 1
mn
∑
ai,
V̂( p̂) =
∑(
pi − p̂
)2
n(n− 1) =
1
(n− 1)
[∑
a2i
m2n
− p̂2
]
,
(10)
where n is the number of enrolled volunteers; m is the
average number of samples per volunteer; ai is the number
of false nonmatches for the ith volunteer; pi = ai/mi is the
proportion of unmatched samples for the ith volunteer; p̂ is
the observed FRR for all volunteers; V̂( p̂) is the estimated
variance of the observed FRR rate.
For experiment 2, FRR = 0.0304. The variance was
calculated to be 1.357× 10−4.
To find the 95% confidence interval, we substitute for the
variance in the following:
p̂ ± z(1− α/2)
√
V̂( p̂), (11)
where z() is the area under standard normal curve with
mean zero. For 95% confidence, z(0.975) is 1.96. The 95%
confidence interval for the true error rate (p) is 0.0075 ≤
p ≤ 0.0532.
To calculate the confidence interval for the FAR rate, we
use the following [5].
If the product N∗ p̂ ≥ 10, (where N is number of
independent trials and p̂ is the observed FAR rate) then we
may use the normal distribution curve to approximate the
95% confidence interval as follows:
p̂ − 2σp̂ ≤ p ≤ p̂ + 2σp̂, (12)
where p is the true FAR rate, σp̂ is the maximum likelihood
estimator which is defined as
σp̂ = 1N
√
e
(
1− e
N
)
, (13)
where e is the number of successful intruder attacks.
The estimated FAR rate recorded for experiment was
0.0375 the 95% confidence interval for the true FRR rate is
calculated as follows:
0.01626 ≤ p ≤ 0.05844. (14)
5.3.2. Recommendations on test size
To improve the statistical significance and accuracy of our
results, we recommend the following.
(1) Firstly, the number of enrolled users should be
increased to at least 100 users.
(2) Then, collect 15 genuine samples per user to produce
a total of 1500 genuine samples. This is above the
requirement of the rule of 30.
(3) Use cross comparison with 10 users per intruder
attack allowing 3 trials per attack. This will produce
3000 intruder attacks. This is above the requirement
of 30.
(4) To minimize the dependency of the intruder attacks
by the same person, it is recommended to collect
these data in two sessions.
(5) Finally, once the data has been collected and ana-
lyzed, the uncertainty in the observed error rates
would be estimated in order to ascertain the size of
the test data.
5.4. Discussion of results
The following observations can be inferred from Table 3.
(i) Since the computer-generated attack list was random,
the number of intruder attacks per user account was
variable. Nevertheless, all accounts have been tested
for intrusion.
(ii) Users who chose passwords identical to their user
name (user 15, 21, and 22) suffered highest rate of
successful intruder attacks.
(iii) Users 1, 4, 7, and 9 had substantially weak passwords.
As expected, users 1, 4, and 7 were susceptible to
successful intruder attacks. However, user 7 repelled
all intruder attacks and after investigation, it was
found that user 7 had a highly distinctive keystroke
pressure template.
(iv) Users who chose standard passwords that comply
with security measures achieved maximum protec-
tion and were able to better resist intruder attacks.
(v) In the experiment, there was one left-handed user,
“user3.” His keystroke pressure template was strong
against intruder attacks. Investigations showed that
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while right-handed users exerted more pressure
typing on right side keys of the keyboard, this left-
handed user exerted more pressure on the left side
keys and hence his pressure template was distinctive
from right-handed intruders.
(vi) The decrease in latency threshold reduces the FRR
rate.
(vii) Users with low latency standard deviation were able
to better repel intruder attacks. This is logical since
low standard deviation suggests that the users typing
pattern is more stable and hence the corresponding
pressure template almost match that of the user.
(viii) The increase of AR threshold from 0.15 to 0.40 has
decreased the FRR rate significantly.
(ix) The intruder knowledge has some effect on his ability
to succeed in attacking other user accounts.
6. CONCLUSION
In the course of the last 30 years, keystroke biometrics has
emerged as a quick and user-friendly solution for access
control systems.
Several commercial keystroke biometric algorithms have
been introduced in the market.
However, most of these algorithms merely use the time
information (latency) of the keystroke action and thus utilize
only one information aspect of the keystroke action. It
neglects the force applied in the keystroke action. PBAS
has successfully acquired both information, time frame and
applied force. Furthermore, the application of force (F)
over time (Δt) has produced significant information in the
form of a signal (pressure template); this approach is more
dynamic and characteristic of user keystroke pattern.
Preliminary tests on PBAS indicated apparent success in
the performance of the system. However, performance can
be further enhanced to produce more accurate and reliable
results.
Furthermore, the experiments have proved that force is
highly distinctive to users typing keystroke. Although some
users may have similar latency profiles, their keystroke pres-
sure templates were easily discriminated. The reinforcement
of pressure sensors to measure the keystroke force has many
advantages such as:
(i) a password obtained by an imposter does not neces-
sarily mean that the imposter can access the system;
(ii) a user’s typing biometric is difficult to steal or imitate;
(iii) an imposter cannot obtain a user’s typing biometrics
by peeking at the user’s typing;
(iv) the hardware reinforcement can be integrated to any
password-based security system, because it works in
conjunction with normal password mechanisms;
(v) the system administrator has the option of turning
on/off the biometric reinforcement at anytime to use
normal password authentication only.
Due to the fact that keystroke dynamics are affected
by many external factors (position of hands while typing,
fatigue, hand injuries, etc.), it is somehow difficult to ensure a
typical pattern for a user’s password every time. This inherent
difficulty favors other biometric authentication techniques
such as fingerprint and retina scan over keystroke biometrics.
In order to overcome this difficulty, dynamic data classifiers
are used with a suitable threshold to accommodate for the
variability in user keystroke pattern.
The combination of AR and latency classifiers allows for
an increase in latency threshold value to decrease the FRR
rates. This increase does not have great effect on the FAR
rates as the AR classifier would reject intruders based on their
pressure templates, on the contrary it will make the system
more user friendly without compromising the security.
AR technique uses AR-coefficients to reconstruct user
pressure templates. This approach provides a more compre-
hensive user identity. Moreover, it is very easy to reconstruct
the user pressure template for user authentication.
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